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Abstract: The subjects’ responsibility for violations of their obligations is incident to any legal 
system. We intend to analyze in this article aspects of states’ responsibility, fundamental institution of 
public international law, relating to its classification as a form of the legal liability and as a 
fundamental principle of public international law, to the codification of international norms 
emphasizing the activity of the International Law Commission, to the two theories of guilt and 
liability based on risk, underlying legal nature of the international responsibility of states and the 
unlawful act, generator of international responsibility. In preparing the paper we used as research 
methods the analysis of the problems generated by the mentioned topic with reference to doctrinal 
views expressed in treaties and specialized papers, solutions retained in international jurisprudence, 
documentary research, interpretation of legal norms in the matter. 
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1. International Responsibility – Form of Legal Liability 
The issue of the international responsibility of states has often been addressed both 
in doctrine and in international practice. The recent events, which give rise to a 
tensed picture of international relations all over the world and at the same time 
closer to our borders, have determined for the international responsibility issue to 
return to our attention. 
The international law system was established as a reflection of international 
society, and it has faithfully followed its historical evolution and it has transposed 
into legal norms the relations between subjects of international law in its successive 
stages of development. Specific for the international law is that states that create 
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international standards, through their agreement of will, freely expressed, treaties 
and customs, they also create mechanisms ensuring the compliance with these rules 
(Maftei, 2010, pp. 16-17). The inconsistency of states’ conduct (or other subjects of 
international law) and the requirements of international legal norms attract the 
international legal responsibility of the subject who violated such a limitation. 
Investigating the legal liability from the perspective of general theory of law shows 
us this concept as a specific form of social responsibility that occurs in case of 
breaching the rules of law. Regarded as compared to other forms of social 
responsibility (moral, political, etc.), the legal liability differs in that it determines 
the obligation of abiding a legal sanction (Huma, 2007, p. 152). The legal liability 
occurs in all branches of law. Max Huber appreciated that liability is “the 
necessary corollary of law” (Huber, 2006, p. 641) 
The International responsibility is one of the fundamental institutions of public 
international law (Maftei & Coman, 2010, p. 109). Referring to the important role 
of this institution, Reuter noted that it can be considered as “the Constitution of the 
international community” because it “is at the heart of international law” (Reuter, 
1995, p. 574) 
The subjects of international law must be reliable for not respecting the assumed 
legal commitments, for disregarding the international law norms. In this respect, in 
the Romanian literature it has been emphasized that “responsibility, under the 
international law, means the obligation of those who violate its rules, to bear the 
consequences of their illicit conduct, an obligation imposed as sanctions 
established by the states.” (Anghel & Anghel, 1998, p. 11) 
The importance of the legal institution of international responsibility appears 
indubitably also from its qualification as principle by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in a decision of 1928 where it is states that “it is a principle of 
international law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation (…)  reparation is the 
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention, and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself”. (Permanent Court of 
International Justice, 1928, p. 29) 
The definition of international liability included in the Dicţionarul de drept 
internaţional public/Dictionary of International Law of 1982 refers to legal 
relations arising as a result of disregarding the international legal norms: the 
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institution of public international law under which the State or other subject of 
international law, committing international wrongful act, is liable to the State 
violated by these acts and to all countries, in the case of international crimes 
(Cloșcă, 1982, p. 249). 
According to Grigore Geamănu, the international responsibility ensures the 
effectiveness of international law and it fulfills important functions: international 
legality, guaranteeing the international legal order, the stability of international 
relations and their development. (Geamănu, 1981, p. 327) 
From the presented definitions there are emerged two fundamental features of 
international responsibility: the international responsibility constitutes a penalty is 
a “continuation” of international obligations. The international liability is 
interrelated with the international obligations. States as subjects of legal relations 
governed by international law, are required to fulfill their obligations under treaties 
and customs, and the international legal responsibility, regarded as a complex 
phenomenon requires a set of rules pertaining to applicable law sanctions as a 
consequence of not complying with a rule of international conduct and it aims as 
blaming, condemning and even repression of non-compliance with the international 
law rules (Anghel & Anghel, 1998, pp. 14-15) in order to restore the international 
legal order. 
 
2. Encoding International Responsibility 
The conventional international law regulates the international responsibility of the 
states only in certain areas1 as lex specialis, it is not so far a general, single regime 
of responsibility. 
The rules relating to international responsibility are customary, and the codification 
of this area is in progress, even if the concerns in this direction started under the 
auspices of the League of Nations. 
After creating the UN and taking up the activity of the International Law 
Commission2, the codification process has experienced a more “fertile” period 
(Moca & Duţu, 2008, p. 52). The International Law Commission was concerned 
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about the issue of codifying the responsibility institution from the first session of 
1949 (Miga-Besteliu, 2006), but it did not grant priority, as it is listed in 13th 
position in the list of 14 topics selected for codification (International Law 
Commission, 1949, p. 281). 
The codification activity of international responsibility of states has considered 
developing a set of general rules, that it would cover a large are of particular 
situations arising in the international practice (Maxim, 2011, p. 7) 
The actual coding work began in 1956 (Crawford, 1998, p. 2), and the International 
Law Commission's activity has resulted in the achievement of several rough drafts 
for which the UN’s General Assembly expressed its appreciation. The draft articles 
on State responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission in 1996 
consisted of three parts: the origin of international responsibility, content, forms 
and degrees of liability and dispute settlement, as detailed in 62 articles (Nastase, 
Aurescu, & Jura, 2002, p. 281). It was considered, however, that it cannot be 
proposed as the text of an international treaty, the Special Rapporteur's conclusion 
being that “the question of the eventual form of the draft articles should be deferred 
for the time being.” (Crawford, 1998, p. 9) 
In 2001, the International Law Commission proposed the UN General Assembly a 
final draft that included 59 articles - “Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts” - and recommended drafting a convention on the matter 
(International Law Commission, 2001)1. Although it brought two essential 
novelties, eliminating the distinction between international crimes and international 
crimes and substituting the international crimes with wrongful acts likely to harm 
the international community as a whole, this project was considered being 
“modest”. (Dupuy, 2012, p. 522)2 
The document adopted by the Resolution of UN General Assembly no. 56/83 of 12 
December 2001 represents undoubtedly an important step in the evolution of 
international law, helping to clarify and strengthen the various traditional rules on 
State responsibility (Diaconu, 2013, p. 14). 
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Although the UN General Assembly repeatedly recommended states to consider 
the issue of adopting an international convention in this field, the efforts of the UN 
specialized body have not materialized in this regard. 
Following the work of the International Law Commission in the codification 
domain of international responsibility, the UN General Assembly has subsequently 
adopted several resolutions: 
- A / RES / 61/36, the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 4 
December 2006 regarding the Principles on the allocation of loss in the 
case of transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities; 
- A / RES / 62/67, the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 6 
December 2007, on Diplomatic protection; 
- A/RES/62/68, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 6 
December 2007, on Prevention of transboundary harm from hazardous 
activities  
- A/RES/66/100, the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 
December 2011 and A/RES/69/126, Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly on 10 December 2014, cu on the responsibility of international 
organizations. 
 
3. The Legal Nature of International Responsibility 
The scientific analysis of international responsibility identifies two theories that 
have been formulated for the substantiation of its legal nature: the theory of guilt 
and the theory based on risk (objective responsibility). 
According to the first theory, the existence of international responsibility is based 
on the breach of an international obligation and on the existence of the subjective 
element of guilt in committing the international wrongful act. 
This theory was supported by Oppenheim, which substantiates the idea of 
international responsibility based on guilt and deception, a state that the act 
adversely affecting another state does not constitute an international wrongful act 
“if committed neither wilfully and maliciously, nor with culpable negligence.” 
(Oppenheim, 1905-1906, p. 311) 
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In arguing this view, Georges Scelle considered that international responsibility 
arises from automatic contrariety between the rule of law and the conduct of state 
bodies, identifying the State with the activity of its bodies or agents and he 
considered that their individual actions deemed to be guilty by incompetence, 
abuse of power, misappropriation of power should be attributed to the State: “S’il y 
a manquement à la règle de doit international, ce ne peut être que pour 
incompétence, excès de pouvoir, détournement de pouvoir, abstention dans 
l’exercice d’une compétence liée, c’est-à-dire, faute d’un agent dans l’exercice de 
la fonction. Nous ne comprenons pas ce que peut être juridiquement une « faute », 
si ce n’est un agissement contraire à la règle de droit/If there is breach of the rule 
of international law, it can only be for incompetence, abuse of power, misuse of 
power, misappropriation of power, the abstention in the exercise of circumscribed 
powers, that is to say, the absence of an officer in the performance of the function. 
We do not understand what can be legally “at fault", if not an act contrary to the 
rule of law”. (Scelle, 1943, p. 685) 
Roberto Ago's view is clearly expressed in his 1939 Délit 
international/International crime “il serait bien étrange que, dans un ordre 
juridique comme l’ordre international, pour la formation duquel les théories du 
droit romain ont eu une importance décisive, ait pu s’affirmer un système excluant 
d’une façon rigide l’élément subjectif de la faute de la détermination du fait 
illicite/it would be strange for in a legal system such as the international order for 
the formation of which the theories of Roman law have had a decisive importance, 
it could assert a system of rigidly excluding the subjective element of the guilt of 
the determination of the wrongful act.” (Ago, 1947, p. 487) 
In his view Anzilotti, who formulated the principle of objectives responsibility 
(Anzilotti, 1906)1, the existence of international responsibility is based on the 
causal link between the activity of the State and the damage caused by this activity 
to another state or international law subject, without requiring proving the guilt 
thereof. That being so, the international responsibility of a state is conditioned by 
the imputability and illegality of its act. 
Regarding the controversy regarding the Civil law or Criminal law nature of State 
responsibility, the International Law Commission recorded in the 1998 Report that 
the majority of its members noted that the rules on State responsibility are norms 
governing the relations between sovereign states, as subjects of international law, 
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without being civil or criminal norms, but sui generis international norms 
(International Law Commission, 1998, p. 70). 
 
4. Wrongful Act - Generator of International Responsibility 
In the specialized literature it has been emphasized the interdependence between 
domestic and international law and the domestic order of some institutions of 
international law, such as the responsibility of the subjects of international law, the 
succession of states, good faith, legal interpretation, etc. (Ciuvăţ & Lupu, 2006, p. 
166) The international responsibility is equivalent to the responsibility of the 
international law subjects. In the contemporary international law, the responsibility 
of States, and (in relation to their specific) of other subjects of international law 
(international organizations, nations fighting for their independence) has two 
forms: the responsibility for acts or unlawful acts in terms of International law 
(violation of customary or conventional international law) and the responsibility for 
injurious consequences arising from activities that are not prohibited by the 
international law (permitted lawful activities). We may consider the international 
responsibility as a legal institution whereby a State or another subject of 
international law which has committed an act detrimental to another state or 
another subject of international law, owes repairs to the party injured by that act. 
As it has been taken from the general theory of liability in internal law, the 
international responsibility has as constituent elements the following, which must 
be met cumulatively: unlawful conduct - representing the violation of rules of 
international law and the imputability of this unlawful conduct of a subject of 
international law, to which the doctrine and the International Law Commission (in 
the draft articles) added the prejudice as a prerequisite for the international 
responsibility (Chirtoaca & Florea, 2014, p. 12). In light of ILC Project 2001 
“Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility of that State” (Article 1). State liability after committing an 
internationally wrongful act is conditioned, according to Article 2 of the Project 
ILC, by the imputability of the international wrongful act (Part I, Chapter II 
Attribution of conduct to a State, Art. 4-11) and by the wrongful acts and deeds of 
the States under the international law (Part I, Chapter III Breach of an international 
obligation, Art. 12-15) (International Law Commission, 2001). 
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The categories of acts and wrongful acts that may be attributable to the State and 
that determine the international responsibility are: acts of state public authorities; 
conduct of other entities empowered to execute elements of the public authority; 
the conduct of persons acting on behalf of the state; conduct of state bodies made 
available to another state or by an international organization; the conduct of state 
bodies that have acted outside their jurisdiction (or ultra vires acts). The state is 
liable therefore for all acts committed within official framework by its legislative, 
administrative or judicial bodies, considering that their acts are acts of the State 
itself (Cretu, 2006, p. 264). They cannot be considered acts of the State: the 
conduct of persons not acting on behalf of the state; the conduct of other state 
bodies on the territory of the concerned State; the conduct of the bodies of an 
international organization in the territory of the concerned State; the conduct of the 
bodies of an insurrectional movement organs conduct. As regards the assigning to 
the illicit conduct, the comments on article 4 of the ILC Project brings important 
clarification: “(4) The attribution of conduct to the State as a subject of 
international law is based on criteria determined by international law and not on 
the mere recognition of a link of factual causality. As a normative operation, 
attribution must be clearly distinguished from the characterization of conduct as 
internationally wrongful. Its concern is to establish that there is an act of the State 
for the purposes of responsibility. To show that conduct is attributable to the State 
says nothing, as such, about the legality or otherwise of that conduct and rules of 
attribution should not be formulated in terms which imply otherwise. But the 
different rules of attribution stated in chapter II have a cumulative effect, such that 
a State may be responsible for the effects of the conduct of private parties, if it 
failed to take necessary measures to prevent those effects. For example, a receiving 
State is not responsible, as such, for the acts of private individuals in seizing an 
embassy, but it will be responsible if it fails to take all necessary steps to protect 
the embassy from seizure, or to regain control over it. In this respect there is often 
a close link between the basis of attribution and the particular obligation said to 
have been breached, even though the two elements are analytically distinct.” 
(International Law Commission, 2001, pp. 38-39) 
The violation by a State, of an international obligation represents “an act of that 
State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless 
of its origin or character” (Article 12 of the Draft CDI 2001, but in order to engage 
the states’ responsibility, it should be fulfilled the condition that the state would 
have been “bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.” (art. 
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13). In the international practice, in Case Concerning United States Diplomat and 
Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America vs. Iran), for example, the 
International Court of Justice ruled that Republic of Iran breached its obligations to 
the United States established by the international conventions currently applicable 
to the two countries1 and the general rules of international law, and that violation 
undertakes its responsibility towards the United States of America under 
international law towards the United States of America under international law 
(International Court of Justice, 1980, p. 44) 
1996 Project of the International Law Commission classifies the international 
wrongful act in two categories: international misdemeanor and international 
crimes, according to the seriousness of the infringement. In article 19, paragraph 2, 
the international crime was defined as being “an internationally wrongful act 
which results from the breach by a State of an international obligation so essential 
for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its 
breach is recognized as a crime that community as a whole constitutes an 
international crime”. International misdemeanor represents any internationally 
wrongful act which is not classified as being international crime. (International 
Law Commission, 1997, pp. 105-106) In the 2001 project it was abandoned this 
distinction. Articles 40 and 41 from the contents of 2001 Project of the 
International Law Commission, in Chapter III of Part II, refer only to “serious 
breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law”, 
inserting the requirement for the states to cooperate to put an end to such 
violations. An act of a State is regarded as a serious breach of such an obligation “if 
it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfill the 
obligation” (art. 40, paragraph 2) and no state shall recognize it as legitimate 
situation created by such a serious breach and will not grant aid or assistance to 
maintain that situation (article 41, paragraph 2). As sustained in the specialized 
literature, these provisions create “a difference in regime” between serious 
violations of obligations under the peremptory norm of general international law 
and other violations of international law norms, regarding the international 
responsibility of states (Nastase, Aurescu & Jura, 2002, p. 283). 
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In the case of the claims submitted by Serbia and Montenegro towards the NATO 
member states1 after bombing its territory, in the lack of a resolution of the UN 
Security Council, the International Court of Justice had to rule on the legality of the 
use of force. The International Court of Justice declared in its decision “profoundly 
concerned with the use of force in Yugoslavia”, a situation that “under the present 
circumstances ... raises very serious issues of international law”. The Court has 
also stated that in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter 
and its own responsibilities in maintaining peace and security established by the 
UN Charter and its Statute “deems it necessary to emphasize that all parties before 
it must act in conformity with their obligations under the United Nations Charter 
and other rules of international law, including humanitarian law” (International 
Court of Justice, 1999, p. 122). 
International responsibility can be removed if certain occurring circumstances 
could lead to exclusion of the illegal nature of the act. The draft articles of the 
International Law Commission in 2001 has included those circumstances in 
Chapter V of Part I, art. 20-25: 
a) the consent of the victim-state (Article 20)2; to exclude the unlawfulness of that 
fact, the consent must be express and validly expressed, prior to committing the 
fact, to not see as the jus cogens violation of rules; in case concerning armed 
activities on the territory of the Congo, the International Court of Justice, 
examining whether Lusaka, Kampala and Harare Agreements include expressed 
valid consent of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the presence of Ugandan 
troops, recorded that Nothing in provisions of Lusaka Agreement can be interpreted 
as affirmation that security interests of Uganda had already required the presence 
of Ugandan forces on territory of the DRC as from September 1998 — Lusaka 
Agreement represented an agreed modus operandi for the parties, providing 
framework for orderly withdrawal of all foreign forces from the DRC — The DRC 
did not thereby recognize situation on ground as legal — Kampala and Harare 
Disengagement Plans did not change legal status of presence of Ugandan troops 
                                                     
1 See (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Canada) (Serbia and 
Montenegro v. France) (Serbia and Monténégro v. Germany) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy) 
(Serbia and Montenegro v. Netherlands) (Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal) (Yugoslavia v. Spain) 
(Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom), List of Cases referred to the Court, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=2#2004. 
2 Article 20 - Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the 
wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the 
limits of that consent. 
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— Luanda Agreement authorized limited presence of Ugandan troops in border 
area — None of the aforementioned Agreements (save for limited exception in the 
Luanda Agreement) constituted consent by the DRC to presence of Ugandan troops 
on Congolese territory for period after July 1999” (International Court of Justice, 
2005, p. 169). Moreover, the Court emphasized that “the fact that the consent that 
had been given to Uganda to place its forces in the DRC, and to engage in military 
operations, was not an open-ended consent. The DRC accepted that Uganda could 
act, or assist in acting, against rebels on the eastern border and in particular to 
stop them operating across the common border. Even had consent to the Ugandan 
military presence extended much beyond the end of July 1998, the parameters of 
that consent, in terms of geographic location and objectives, would have remained 
thus restricted”. (International Court of Justice, 2005, pp. 198-199); 
b) self-defense (Article 21)1; if the act is a legitimate measure of self-defense taken 
in conformity with the UN Charter, the unlawful nature of that act is removed; as 
such, it cannot be the basis for the international responsibility of that State; the 
United Nations Charter guarantees self-defense in article 51, which states: 
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security”; legitimate defense is an exception to the 
prohibition of the use of force principle; in the Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) Case, 
International Court of Justice stated that: “In the case of individual self-defense, the 
exercise of this right is subject to the State concerned having been the victim of an 
armed attack. Reliance on collective self-defense of course does not remove the 
need for this” (International Court of Justice, 1986, p. 103) and concluded that 
accordingly, the Court concludes that the plea of collective self-defense against an 
alleged armed attack on El Salvador. Honduras or Costa Rica, advanced by the 
United States to justify its conduct toward Nicaragua. cannot be upheld ; and 
accordingly that the United States has violated the principle prohibiting recourse 
to the threat or use of force by the acts listed in paragraph 227 above. and by its 
assistance to the contras to the extent that this assistance "involve[s] a threat or 
use of force (paragraph 228 above)” (International Court of Justice, 1986, p. 123). 
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of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
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c) counter measures represent, in the formulation of Article 221 of the International 
Law Commission's Project, the actions that are not in conformity with the 
international law, but legitimate as they are adopted by a state in response to the 
unlawful conduct of another State; the justification for those actions that do not 
involve the use of force or threat of force, can be found in chapter II of part three of 
the ILC project where there are specified the rules on proportionality (article 51), 
prior notification (article 52 (1)), the temporary feature of countermeasures (article 
53) and the prohibition of countermeasures (article 50); Denis Alland (2002, p. 
1226) called them “mechanisms of private justice”, the countermeasures have been 
confirmed by international jurisprudence as circumstances that exclude the 
unlawful nature of an act: in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) Case, The Court stated that 
“These violations cannot be justified either by collective self-defense, for which, as 
the Court has recognized, the necessary circumstances are lacking, nor by any 
right of the United States to take countermeasures involving the use of force in the 
event of intervention by Nicaragua in El Salvador, since no such right exists under 
the applicable international law. They cannot be justified by the activities in El 
Salvador attributed to the Government of Nicaragua. The latter activities, 
assuming that they did in fact occur, do not bring into effect any right belonging to 
the United States which would justify the actions in question. Accordingly, such 
actions constitute violations of Nicaragua's sovereignty under customary 
international law (International Court of Justice, 1986, p. 128). 
d) force majeure (Article 23), as the circumstance which excludes the unlawfulness 
of the act, represents the intervention of the irresistible force or of unforeseen event 
beyond the control of the State and which renders impossible the execution of the 
obligation in the given circumstances; the unlawful feature exists if the state 
contributed to its production or assumed the risk of the resulted situation; for 
example, in the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice, in 
Case concerning the payment of various Serbian loans issued in France, in 1929, 
the Court noted that: “it cannot be maintained that the war itself, despite its grave 
economic consequences, affected the legal obligations of the contracts between the 
Serbian Government and the French bondholders. The economic dislocations 
caused by the war did not release the debtor State, although they may present 
                                                     
1 Article 22 - The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation 
towards another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken 
against the latter State in accordance with chapter II of part three. 
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equities which doubtless will receive appropriate consideration in the negotiations 
and - if resorted to - the arbitral determination for which Article II of the Special 
Agreement provides” (Permanent Court of International Justice, 1929, pp. 39-40). 
e) state of danger (article 24 (1)1) removes the wrongful feature of the act, in the 
case where the author had no other reasonable way, in that situation, in order to 
save his life or to save the lives of other persons entrusted to his care; the situation 
should not be entrusted to the State's conduct which invokes it, and that is not 
likely to create a comparable greater danger; in Case Concerning the Aerial 
incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America, the 
International Court of Justice had to judge the dispute between the two countries, 
following the action brought by the Islamic Republic against the USA for wrongful 
acts committed against aviation security; the US shot down an Iranian commercial 
airliner over the Persian Gulf and killed 290 passengers and its crew; although the 
USA has motivated in the Preliminary Objections that the “U.S. military forces 
took an active role in responding to requests for help from U.S. vessels and from 
other vessels in distress when attacked by Iranian military and paramilitary 
gunboats” (International Court of Justice, 2000, p. 18), the Court classified the US 
action as illegal and condemned it as such, while recommending in the future for 
the US to take all security measures in compliance with the UN Charter. Later Iran 
withdrew the charges, the Court noting that “Whereas by a letter dated 22 
February 1996, filed in the Registry on the same day, the Agents of the two Parties 
jointly notified the Court that their Governments had agreed to discontinue the 
case because they had entered into «an agreement in full and final settlement of al1 
disputes, differences, claims, counterclaims and matters directly or indirectly 
raised by or capable of arising out of, or directly or indirectly related to or 
connected with, this case»” (International Court of Justice, 1996, p. 10); the US has 
offered a compensation of 131.8 million dollars to the Iranian government, of 
which 61.8 million dollars went to the victims' families. (International Court of 
Justice, 1996) 
f) the state of necessity (Article 25 of the ILC Project) may be invoked to remove 
the wrongful feature of the act, in case the essential interests are endangered: the 
territorial status, the form of government, the independence or the capacity to act of 
                                                     
1 Article 24 (1) - The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international 
obligation of that State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, 
in a situation of distress, of saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the 
author’s care. 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol. 8, no. 1/2015 
 50 
the state; it cannot be invoked the state of necessity if the international obligation in 
question excludes the possibility of invoking the necessity or if the State concerned 
has contributed to the state of necessity; and in the international practice it was 
detained the exceptional nature of accepting a situation as being a state of 
necessity; in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, the International 
Court of Justice has considered that the state of necessity is a ground recognized by 
customary international law for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in 
conformity with an international obligation. It observes moreover that such ground 
for precluding wrongfulness can only be accepted on an exceptional basis. The 
International Law Commission was of the same opinion when it explained that it 
had opted for a negative form of words in Article 33 of its Draft «in order to show, 
by this formal means also, that the case of invocation of a state of necessity as a 
justification must be considered as really constituting an exception - and one even 
more rarely admissible than is the case with the other circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness...»” and it has admitted that “the concerns expressed by Hungary for 
its natural environment in the region affected by the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project related to an "essential interest" of that State, within the meaning given to 
that expression in Article 33 of the Draft of the International Law Commission.” 
(International Court of Justice, 1997, pp. 40-41) 
Whether the exculpatory circumstances are beyond the control of the victim (force 
majeure, fortuitous event, state of danger and state of necessity) or arising from the 
conduct of the victim (self-defense, countermeasures) (Miga-Besteliu, 2008, p. 31), 
their invocation to exclude the wrongful nature will not affect the obligation in 
question, if also to the extent that the circumstance that removes the unlawful 
nature no longer exists and also there is no question of compensation for any 
material loss caused by the act in question. None of exculpatory circumstances 
does not remove the unlawful nature of a State, which does not comply with an 
obligation arising from a peremptory norm (de jus cogens) of the general 
international law (article 26 of the ILC Project) 
The damage caused as a result of the unlawful conduct of a state could be material, 
when it is damaged the state-victim patrimony or of its citizens and it is assessable 
pecuniary or moral, when there are affected non-property values of the state (e.g. 
violating the airspace of a state). 
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The prejudice is direct when it is affected the state as subject of law or its State 
organs and mediated, when there are affected the rights of citizens of a state as 
individuals or legal persons who are nationals of that State. 
Compensation for the prejudice may take one of the following forms: restitution in 
kind (restitutio in integrum), repair by equivalent (compensation) and satisfaction 
(formal apology). 
Restitutio in integrum involves restoring, where possible, the existing situation 
before committing the act. In the present Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, 
Permanent Court of International Justice said that the purpose of repairing is to 
remove all the consequences of international wrongful act (Permanent Court of 
International Justice, 1928, p. 47). A priority will be the restitution in kind and only 
when it is not possible repairing than the equivalent will be applied: “Restitution in 
kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which 
a restitution in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or payment in place of 
it - such are the principles which should serve to determine the amount of 
compensation due for an act contrary to international law” (Permanent Court of 
International Justice, 1928, p. 47). The refund does not involve a totally 
disproportionate burden, and must cover any damage compensation assessable in 
financial terms. 
Satisfaction is considered a form of compensation for moral damages and it may 
consist in recognizing the abuse, by expressing official apology and regret and it is 
granted to the extent that the damage is not repaired by restitution or compensation 
or it cannot be estimated financially (Burian 2009, p. 618). Satisfaction must not be 
disproportionate to the injury in question. In LaGrand Case, the International Court 
of Justice ruled that, although “the United States has presented an apology to 
Germany for this breach”, „ an apology is not sufficient in this case, as it would not 
be in other cases where foreign nationals have not been advised without delay of 
their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention and have 
been subjected to prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties”. 
(International Court of Justice, 2001, p. 618) In any case, satisfaction should not 
represent a humiliating form for the responsible State (article 37 (3), ILC Draft). 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol. 8, no. 1/2015 
 52 
5. Conclusions 
Ideologists and international practice unanimously admit as principle that any 
behavior deemed to be wrongful under the international law it must incur the 
state/states responsibility. 
The institution of international responsibility of states has developed with the 
evolution of international law and in our brief analysis on the international 
responsibility of States for wrongful acts we have tried to highlight the efforts of 
the  International Law Commission of nearly half a century for the codification and 
progressive development of this very important area of public international law and 
to clarify certain aspects of the implementation by States of customary and 
conventional rules in this area in the contemporary international society. 
Our approach is obviously perfectible and in a future analysis we will address the 
international responsibility of states also from other perspectives. 
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